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Abstract
We apply results from recent theoretical work on networks of rela-
tions to analyze optimal peering strategies for asymmetric ISPs. It is
shown that - from a network of relations perspective – ISPs’ asymmetry
in bilateral peering agreements need not be a problem, since when these
form a closed network, asymmetries are pooled and information transmis-
sion is faster. Both these effects reduce the incentives for opportunism in
general, and interconnection quality degradation in particular. We also
explain why bilateral monetary transfers between asymmetric ISPs (Bi-
lateral Paid Peering), though potentially good for bilateral peering, may
have rather negative effects on the sustainability of the overall peering
network.
∗We would like to thank Emanuele Giovannetti for encouraging us to write this paper, and
Simona Fabrizi as well as conference participants at University of Cambridge and the 2006
ASSET meeting for their helpful comments. We are especially grateful to two anonymous
referees for excellent suggestions, which significantly improved the paper. Lippert gratefully
acknowledges funds from the CEPR RTN “Competition Policy in International Markets”
(HPRN-CT-2002-00224) and research funds from the Massey University College of Business.
†Massey University, Department of Commerce, PB 102 904, NSMC, Auckland, New
Zealand. Phone +64 9 414 0800 Ext. 9283. Email s.lippert@massey.ac.nz.
‡Stockholm School of Economics, Department of Economics, P.O. Box 6501, SE–113 83
Stockholm, Sweden, and Consip Research Unit, Via Isonzo, 19/E, I–00198 Rome, Italy. Phone
+39 320 431 2186. Email giancaspagnolo@yahoo.com.
1
1 Introduction
Consumer welfare from Internet services, such as exchanging emails, accessing
web sites, or concluding transactions with users located elsewhere, crucially de-
pends on the ability of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to connect their users
with those of other ISPs anywhere in the world. There are two ways in which
ISPs can be interconnected. The most common one is transit: ISPs buy con-
nectivity from large Internet Backbone Providers (IBPs) that can carry traffic
all over the Internet. The second way to interconnect is peering agreements, i.e.
reciprocal relationships, where two ISPs establish and maintain a direct inter-
connection through which they exchange exclusively their own end-customers’
traffic with each other (Giovannetti et al. [9]). Unless two ISPs exchange very
little traffic, peering is the most efficient form of interconnection as – being a di-
rect connection – it does not route traffic through other intermediate networks,
thus avoiding potential congestion on other paths and increasing overall traffic
speed.
A frequently voiced problem with reciprocal peering is that traffic flows
between two ISPs are often highly asymmetric, so that ISPs have asymmetric
incentives to engage in peering and to maintain a high quality of interconnection,
up to the point where too asymmetric situations have led to the most extreme
form of interconnection quality degradation: complete depeering1. Monetary
compensation to balance asymmetric allocations of costs and benefits of peering,
so-called “paid peering”, is seen by many as a natural, though partial, solution
to this problem (see e.g. Miller [20], Norton [21], or Jahn and Pru¨fer[14]).
Typically, these studies as well as the peering practice view the peering deci-
sion as an inherently bilateral one: Two ISPs have to decide bilaterally whether
or not it is worthwhile establishing, maintaining, and insuring a certain quality
of service on a direct interconnection. The embeddedness of these decisions into
a network, both of traffic exchange and of decisions to peer, is ignored.
In this paper, we take a different road. We apply recent theoretical results
on networks of long-term cooperative relationships to the analysis of the opti-
mal interconnection strategies of asymmetric ISPs when quality maintenance is
not easily monitored, so that there is scope for “moral hazard” in the form of
interconnection quality degradation. We show that taking an explicit network
perspective – as appropriate, though opposed to the bilateral perspective typical
of the discussion and literature on peering – asymmetric traffic flows need not
lead to any asymmetric incentives to peer, if the network is “closed”. A closed
network of peering relationships pools asymmetries across peering partners and
facilitates information sharing on the behavior of each ISP, thereby fostering
cooperation in terms of high interconnection quality maintenance.
We proceed by clarifying why monetary transfers may indeed facilitate bi-
lateral peering relationships; then showing that, when an appropriate network
perspective is taken, bilateral monetary payments – bilateral paid peering – may
1Historical attempts at depeering include BBNPlanet vs Exodus, PSI vs Cable and Wire-
less, AOL/ADTN vs Cogent, Teleglobe vs Cogent, France Telecom vs Cogent, Level(3) vs
XO, or Level (3) vs Cogent.
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actually end up harming the “ecosystem” of the peering networks by making
more bilateral peering relations sustainable on their own, independent of other
peering relationships. This reduced interdependence of individual elements of
the network may prevent its ability to sustain a high quality of service by de-
terring opportunistic quality-reducing strategies with the threat of a “domino
effect” on interconnection quality.
We conclude that large ISPs should adopt a global network approach when
defining their interconnection strategies, valuing more asymmetric peering re-
lationships with smaller ISPs when these close the network and speed up infor-
mation transmission; that even when ISPs take a network perspective, they will
still be likely to undervalue (at least from one side) asymmetric peering rela-
tions by not fully internalizing the “social” value of a closed network; but that
public policies (e.g. subsidies) aimed at correcting this market failure might
have the same negative consequence of monetary payments in terms of reduced
interdependence and cooperation on quality maintenance in the network.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the
determinants of ISPs’ peering strategies; Section 3 proposes a simple model
of cooperation in peering; Section 4 introduces the effect of peering networks’
‘closure’ on the sustainability of asymmetric peering relationships; and Section
5 studies the information-sharing effects of peering networks. In addition, both
sections 4 and 5, highlight positive and negative effects of ‘bilateral paid peering’.
Finally, Section 6 summarizes and proposes policy and strategy implications.
2 The bilateral peering decision
In this section, we will examine the peering decision of two ISPs in a purely
bilateral setting.
Peering vs. transit Global connectivity is largely provided to the ISPs
by Internet Backbone Providers (IBPs) in exchange for a payment to carry the
traffic. IBPs invest in and maintain backbone capacity, i.e. typically in large
long-distant fiber optic cables with a huge capacity of data throughput. An ISP
connects to the IBP who charges a fee to the ISP for this connection, which
may be flat for the access, related to the capacity of the connection link, or
usage dependent, where the traffic is metered and billed, or a combination.
This contractual relationship between the IBP and the ISP is called transit.
It is the primary way in which ISPs provide their customers with access to
web pages (Miller [20]). The backbone services market is characterized by huge
fixed investments, leading to a small number of IBPs, which are, in turn, able to
exercise market power (see Giovannetti and Ristuccia [10], or Giovannetti et al.
[8]), which often takes the form of discrimination in terms of connection quality
(see Cre´mer et al. [6]), and which depends on the relative size of the networks
exchanging data.
Another way of giving access to web pages hosted by an ISP different from
that of the end user requesting the access is by means of peering agreements.
Peering is a bilateral, reciprocal relationship in which two ISPs exchange exclu-
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sively their own end-customers’ traffic directly with each other (Giovannetti et
al. [9]). Typically, these agreements are settlement free, i.e. traffic and access
are not billed, even though Miller [20] reports that recently, some networks have
started “charging for peering, [...] because the value proposition is unbalanced
in some way.”
ISP ISP
Internet Backbone
Transit
Connection
Transit
Connection
ISP ISP
Internet Backbone
Peering
Connection
Figure 1: Two ways of interconnecting: transit and peering
To engage in peering, two ISPs have to physically connect their networks.
There are two commonly used options for doing so. One is circuit-based : Two
ISPs create a physical connection (a direct exchange point) between their net-
works, i.e. they run a cable directly from one ISP’s network to that of the other,
the cost of which are typically shared equally among the two networks. The
second option is exchange-based : Both ISPs connect a cable to a switch at the
same Internet Exchange Point (IXP). An IXP is “a physical infrastructure that
allows different Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to exchange Internet traffic
between their networks”. The costs for operating an IXP are shared by its
member ISPs2. Engaging in peering is, thus, economically viable only from a
certain traffic size.
The advantages of peering Baake and Wichmann [2] (among other au-
thors) argue that transit implies that a package has to take “a detour” through
“several ‘routers’ that determine which way it has to take,” which “typically
implies a lower quality of service: transferring the same amount of data takes
longer and response time (the so-called ‘latency’) increases.” Peering avoids
this detour and, thus, often the time from the start of packet transmission to
the start of packet reception, i.e. latency, is reduced. Second, as only the two
ISPs, the one originating the request and the one hosting the web page, are
involved in the exchange, they determine the speed of the transmission, i.e. the
time from the start of packet reception to the end of packet reception, with
their own bandwidth and the bandwidth of the connection between each other.
No congestion of a third network has an impact on connection quality. Finally,
no upstream provider (Internet backbone) must be payed for the traffic, which
reduces the variable cost of exchanging data between the two ISPs. Besides
these general advantages, peering at an IXP often involves other forms of coop-
eration, such as information sharing or free mutual technical help forums. Thus,
the advantages of peering are a reduction in latency and an increase in speed,
and possibly a reduction in the variable cost of exchanging data.
2More information can be found on http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet exchange point
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Cooperation in peering However, the bilateral exchange of data within
a peering agreement among ISPs may not always come into existence, even
though it may be technically feasible and economically viable. There are three
important technological features of the Internet, which determine the necessity
and the sustainability of cooperation within peering agreements (see Giovannetti
et al. [9]). First, “only the amount of traffic exchanged between two networks
can be measured, and not the paths followed by each packet”. This makes the
quality of connections not contractible. Second, given that transmission within
one’s own network is costly3, and given that ISPs often have multiple points
of interconnection, it is common practice to pass traffic off to another network
as quickly as possible, and thus use the other network for wide-area transit.
This practice is called “Hot Potato Routing” (see also Laffont et al. [17] and
[18] for “hot potato” behavior among Internet backbones). This phenomenon
is described in figure 2: ISP 1 routes the request of its end user C1 out of its
own network as quickly as possible. ISP 2 does the same with the response of
its customer (a web site) C2.
ISP 1
ISP 2
C2
C1
Figure 2: Hot potato routing (adapted from Kende [15])
Third, the speed of the connection between two end users is determined by
the congestion in the networks on its path. As the hot potato routing feature
leads traffic out of one’s own network as soon as possible, the most congested
network on the path contributes the most to the delay. Each single ISP’s efforts
aimed at avoiding congestion, i.e. maintenance of bandwidth capacity or of
redundancy, benefits both peering ISPs, leading to free-riding and, thus, too low
maintenance. As these efforts are not contractible, overcoming this free-riding
problem requires cooperation, which may be enforced in the dynamic course of
interaction between peering ISPs4 through the threat of retaliation.
Constantiou and Courcoubetis [5] describe the informational problems be-
tween ISPs and the resulting individually rational “moral hazard” behavior. The
inability to perfectly monitor the effort of a peering partner after concluding the
peering agreement may induce partners to alter their efforts opportunistically.
3This cost includes, for example, the maintenance of routers and long-distance cables and
the avoidance of congestion (see Buccirossi et al. [4]).
4Indeed, given the necessity to cooperate, Giovannetti et al. [9] find in an empirical study
that geographic proximity, which helps the enforcement of implicit contracts, has an impact
on the decision of ISPs of whether to peer or exchange traffic via transit.
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As a result,
• an ISP may not keep upgrading his network capacity after an intercon-
nection agreement. This will result in poorer servicing of the partner’s
traffic. As peering agreements currently are based on best effort services,
such behavior cannot be easily verified;
• an ISP may actively discriminate against IP packets that enter into his net-
work from the interconnected partner when its network has large amounts
of local traffic;
• an ISP may overbook its network in order to maximize economies of scale.
To avoid congestion the ISP may delay or not admit interconnected traffic.
This is not the predictable outcome under ’naturally’ arising congestion
but the result of intentional unilateral overbooking.
Asymmetries and cooperation in peering In particular, asymmetries
in the traffic flows present obstacles to the incentives to engage in coopera-
tive peering agreements, the refusal of which is an extreme form of the quality
degradation described by Cre´mer et al. [6]. The main reasons for a refusal to
enter peering agreements are the “backbone free-riding” and “business stealing”
effects.
Various studies (e.g. Norton [22]) highlight that most relationships between
ISPs are asymmetric and – as emphasized by Giovannetti et al. [9] – unbal-
anced situations have in some cases led to the discontinuation of the peering
arrangement. Large ISPs may not want to engage in peering with smaller, often
regional, providers as they fear backbone free-riding (see Baake and Wichmann
[2], or Kende [15] for the IBP market). Figure 3 describes the phenomenon: The
smaller, regional ISP 2 benefits from being connected to a larger, national ISP
1, which maintains a national backbone capacity, by being able to connect its
customer C2 to the national ISP’s geographically distant customer C1, without
having to invest in its own backbone capacity.
ISP 1
ISP 2
C2
C1
Figure 3: Backbone free-riding (adapted from Kende [15])
Peering agreements induce a reduction in latency, as compared to transit.
Without peering, only the customers of the ISP hosting a web site would enjoy
this low latency. With a peering agreement, also the end users of the competing
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ISP enjoy a low latency, thereby making customers more willing to move over.
This effect has been described as a business stealing effect (Baake andWichmann
[2]), as it induces large ISPs to reduce the interconnection quality in peering
agreements with smaller ISPs to steal their customers (see Cre´mer et al. [6]).
Both the backbone free-riding and the business stealing effect imply that
the larger network has a higher incentive to renege on interconnection quality
than the smaller one. As expressed by Huston [12]: “The larger provider often
provides more traffic to a smaller attached provider than it receives from that
provider [...]” and “[...] traffic-receiving volumes typically coincide with the
relative interconnection benefit to the two providers”.
As peering is technically efficient, solutions have been sought to overcome
the asymmetric incentive problems. One natural solution that emerged is paid
peering (Miller [20], Norton [21]).
3 A simple model of cooperation in peering
Assume there to be two internet service providers, ISP 1 and ISP 2. Both
must decide whether to start and maintain a direct peering link between each
other, or instead indirectly exchange traffic through transit purchased from a
large backbone operator. If they purchase transit, let their payoff be t1 and
t2, respectively. If they peer, they simultaneously decide about their effort to
provide interconnection quality. For simplicity, assume that each ISP can only
choose either high effort, ehi , or low effort, e
l
i. If an ISP provides high (low)
effort, his peering partner will receive a high (low) quality interconnection and
a benefit Bhi (B
l
i), where B
l
i < B
h
i . Providing high (low) effort leads to a cost
of Chi (C
l
i), where C
h
i > C
l
i . The normal form game in figure 4 represents the
strategic situation of the two ISPs.
ISP 1
ISP 2
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2
el
2
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1
Bh
1
− Ch
1
, Bh
2
− Ch
2
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1
− Ch
1
, Bh
2
− Cl
2
el
1
Bh
1
− Cl
1
, Bl
2
− Ch
2
Bl
1
− Cl
1
, Bl
2
− Cl
2
Figure 4: Normal form representation of the effort decision
Assuming Bhi − C
h
i > B
l
i − C
l
i , this payoff matrix fulfills the properties of a
prisoners’ dilemma. Both players benefit from a unilateral deviation to providing
the lower effort: They save fully in cost, bear none of the loss in benefits from
customer satisfaction, and may even win over some of the other ISPs customers
since the connections are of high quality within their own network. This is true,
notwithstanding which effort level the other ISP is providing. However, if both
are providing low effort, both are worse off than if both were providing high
effort.
The theory of repeated games5 tells us that if players maximize the present
5See Abreu [1]
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value of their utility stream discounted with the relevant factor δ and there is
complete information on each party’s past behavior, the outcome
(
eh
1
, eh
2
)
can
be sustained in equilibrium if and only if both
(
Bh
1
− Ch
1
)
1− δ
≥
(
Bh
1
− Cl
1
)
+
δ
(
Bl
1
− Cl
1
)
1− δ
, and(
Bh
2
− Ch
2
)
1− δ
≥
(
Bh
2
− Cl
2
)
+
δ
(
Bl
2
− Cl
2
)
1− δ
.
The payoffs in the normal form are ISP-specific, indicating potential asym-
metries. Let, without loss of generality, ISP 1 be larger than ISP 2. Then,
typically, ISP 2 benefits more from the peering relation than ISP 1, i.e.
Bh
1
−Bl
1
< Bh
2
−Bl
2
.
This may lead to a situation where
(
Bh
1
− Ch
1
)
1− δ
<
(
Bh
1
− Cl
1
)
+
δ
(
Bl
1
− Cl
1
)
1− δ
, while(
Bh
2
− Ch
2
)
1− δ
≥
(
Bh
2
− Cl
2
)
+
δ
(
Bl
2
− Cl
2
)
1− δ
.
In this case, in a peering relation, low efforts would be provided and a peering
agreement would only be concluded and sustained if the payoff from a peering
agreement with low efforts, Bl
1
− Cl
1
and Bl
2
− Cl
2
, were larger than that from
transit, t1 and t2, for each of the two operators.
Paid peering has emerged and is advocated as a possible, natural way of
addressing the traffic asymmetry problem in peering relationships (e.g. Miller
[20], Norton [21]). Indeed, standard game theoretic arguments show how the
possibility of operating monetary transfers may facilitate cooperation in asym-
metric bilateral relationships. If ISP 2 transfers an amount T to ISP 1 in each
period, maintaining a high quality peering link will be an equilibrium if
(
Bh
1
− Ch
1
)
+ T
1− δ
≥
(
Bh
1
− Cl
1
)
+ T +
δ
(
Bl
1
− Cl
1
)
1− δ
, and(
Bh
2
− Ch
2
)
− T
1− δ
≥
(
Bh
2
− Cl
2
)
+
δ
(
Bl
2
− Cl
2
)
1− δ
.
These two condition imply the following proposition, the proof of which we
relegate to the appendix.
Proposition 1 It is possible to reduce the discount factor necessary to sustain
the high quality connection with a transfer T ≥ 0 if and only if
δ
((
Bh
2
−Bl
2
)
−
Ch
2
− Cl
2
δ
)
−
((
Bh
1
−Bl
1
)
−
Ch
1
− Cl
1
δ
)
≥ 0.
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Proposition 1 states that, for a given discount factor δ, for which the big ISP
has a negative net gain from the high quality connection, a positive bilateral
monetary transfer (i.e. bilateral paid peering) helps sustain cooperative peering
relationships if and only if the small ISP has enough to gain as compared to
the big ISP. In sections 4.3 and 5.3, we will show that, when taking a network
perspective, other considerations may run against this simple argument.
4 Pooling asymmetries
In this section, we will first briefly discuss some theoretical results in Lippert
and Spagnolo6 [19] (from here on LS) and then apply them to shed some light
on when and how the network structure of peering relationships among ISPs
may substantially reduce the problem of asymmetry in bilateral relations. We
will finally show that introducing bilateral paid peering is only an imperfect
substitute for making use of the network structure of the peering relationships.
In the discussion that follows, it is important to distinguish between the
“data exchange network” from the “relational network”, which is spanned by
the ISPs’ peering agreements. Defining the latter as the network of peering
relationships, which are part of a multilateral agreement, it is useful to keep
in mind that not every pair of ISPs, who exchange traffic within a peering
relationship, need to be part of the relational network.
4.1 Pooling asymmetries in the theory of relational net-
works
LS [19] show that if players repeatedly interact in bilateral prisoners’ dilemmas
with asymmetric gains from cooperation, they may cooperate for a larger range
of discount factors, if they are able to pool payoff asymmetries in a multilateral
punishment mechanism.
Consider figure 5, which represents the normal form of a generic prisoners’
dilemma, in which ci stands for the cooperation payoff, di for the payoff if
both defect, bi stands for the payoff player i gets if he betrays while the other
player cooperates, and li stands for the loss payoff if player i is betrayed while
cooperating.
In the infinitely repeated version of this game with players maximizing their
discounted present value, discounted with a common discount factor δ, let
1
1− δ
c1 − b1 −
δ
1− δ
d1
6There is a large and very interesting literature on network formation (for a survey of the
literature, see Jackson [13]) which deals with the question of predicting an equilibrium network
structure and its social properties, given the value of a network, the cost of establishing a link,
and the distribution of the network’s value among the network members. However, in this
paper, we are not dealing with network formation but with the enforceability of implicit
cooperative agreements in dynamic settings within an existing network. To our knowledge,
for this purpose, the closest reference is Lippert and Spagnolo [19]
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Player 1
Player 2
C D
C c1, c2 l1, b2
D b1, l2 d1, d2
Figure 5: Normal form representation of a prisoners’ dilemma
be player 1’s net gain from cooperating with player 2, and let the respective
expression with payoffs of player 2 be player 2’s net gain from cooperating
with player 1. In general, this net gain can be positive or negative. In order
to sustain C1, C2 forever as an equilibrium of the bilateral repeated prisoners’
dilemma from figure 5, it is necessary and sufficient that both players have a
positive net gain from cooperating7.
Assume that player 1 has a negative net gain, whereas player 2 has a positive
one. Let these two players be aware of the fact that they are interacting not
only with each other, but also with other players and assume for simplicity that
each player observes the history of all other players in the network.
Denoting players as nodes of a network and the relations between these
players as arcs, where an incoming arrow signifies a non-negative net gain from
cooperation, it is possible to depict a collection of such cooperative relations in
a network. Take figures 6 and 7 as an illustration. In these figures, the incoming
arrow for player 2 means that, in his relation with player 1, 1
1−δ
c2−b2−
δ
1−δ
d2 ≥
0, i.e. 2 has a non-negative net gain from cooperation with 1. Player 1 on the
other hand does not have an incoming arrow in his relation with 2, i.e. in his
relation with player 2, c1
1−δ
− b1 −
δd1
1−δ
< 0: player 1 has a negative net gain
from cooperation with player 2.
1 2 3 1
2
3
Figure 6: Non-circular networks
In the networks in figure 6, the cooperative outcome is not an equilibrium
as player 1 only has relation(s) with a negative net gain from cooperating. In
the network in figure 7, however, cooperation may be an equilibrium as each
player has a relation with a positive net gain from cooperation. Define strategy
profile 1 as follows.
Strategy Profile 1 Every player, who is part of the multilateral agreement
7Note that the terms in the net gains from cooperating correspond to the payoffs a player
receives from playing Friedman’s [7] grim trigger strategies.
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1 2
3
Figure 7: Circular network
1. starts playing C with every neighbor in the agreement,
2. continues playing C with every neighbor in the agreement as long as he
observes C from every player in the agreement, and
3. reverts to D with every neighbor in the agreement for ever otherwise.
Strategy profile 1 is an equilibrium as long the sum of the net gains of each
player’s for all his relations is positive. This implies the following result shown
in LS [19]: For an environment with perfect transmission of information on the
history of any player in the network, if each of the bilateral relations is such
that due to an asymmetry in the payoffs, one player has a positive net gain from
cooperation and the other has a negative one, then, absent transfers,
1. cooperation in non-circular networks, i.e. in lines, stars, or other forms of
trees, is not sustainable because of an “end-network effect” analogous to
“end game effects” in finally repeated games;
2. cooperation in circular networks is sustainable if and only if the sum of
the net gains from cooperating is positive for each player.
4.2 Pooling asymmetries in peering
The results just examined have implications for peering agreements among ISPs.
Let us examine an example where the asymmetries of ISPs come from different
geographical “home” markets. Suppose there to be three ISPs, 1, 2, and 3 with
home markets A, B, and C, respectively, in which they are the market leader.
Let ISPs 1, 2, and 3 have a subsidiary in the foreign markets C, A, and B,
respectively, which have a small market share. Let us assume that a large part
of the traffic originates and terminates in the same region.8 The situation is
depicted in figure 8.
Figure 9 depicts the situation described in a network representation. The
three ISPs are the nodes of the network and their peering agreements are rep-
resented by the edges of the graph. Let the arrows once more signify the
8This is increasingly the case, as noted by Giovannetti and Ristuccia [10], since there is
a growing cultural and linguistic differentiation of web contents, especially in Europe, and a
simultaneous proliferation of regional European Internet Exchange Points.
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ISP 1
ISP 2
C2A
C1ARegion A
Peering?
ISP 2
ISP 3
C3B
C2BRegion B
Peering?
ISP 3
ISP 1
C1C
C3CRegion C
Peering?
Figure 8: Three bilateral peering decisions and the backbone free-riding problem
ISP 1 ISP 2
ISP 3
ISP 1 ISP 2
ISP 3
Figure 9: Network Representation of the Bilateral (left) and the Multilateral
(right) Peering Decision
net gains of cooperation, i.e. an ISP i has an incoming arrow iff
(Bhi −C
h
i )
1−δ
≥(
Bhi − C
l
i
)
+
δ(Bli−C
l
i)
1−δ
. In the left-hand panel, the shadowed representation of
the peering relations between ISPs 1 and 3 and ISPs 2 and 3 signifies that these
are not taken into account when ISPs 1 and 2 make the decision about peering
in market A. In that market, ISP 1 has a negative net gain from peering with
ISP 2 and, bilaterally, peering would not be sustainable. However, taking into
account that there is a region B and a region C and that the peering decisions
with ISP 3 are to be taken, the ISPs might conclude the following multilateral
agreement:
• The three pairs of ISPs conclude peering agreements.
• Each ISP provides high effort in his peering relations as long as he has
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not observed too low a level of quality provided by any ISP, who is part
of the multilateral agreement.
• Each ISP reverts to the low effort level in both peering relations (or just
depeers) as soon as he observes too low a level of quality provided by any
ISP, who is part of the multilateral agreement.
This multilateral agreement sustains the high quality connection if and only
if for each ISP, the sum of the net gains from cooperation with both peering
partners is non-negative. If any of the three providers starts providing low effort,
there will be depeering in both markets, and he will also lose the beneficial high
quality peering relationship in the foreign market. This multilateral mechanism
is depicted in right-hand panel of figure 9. This mechanism can be refined in the
spirit of Green and Porter [11] to account for the uncertainties in the market,
such that ISPs carry out a limited time punishment whenever the connection
quality is lower than a certain threshold. It can also be adapted to an envi-
ronment where each ISP only observes the quality of his own traffic exchanges.
The main insight stays the same and is be summarized by proposition 2.
Proposition 2 Appropriate pooling of asymmetric peering relationships in mul-
tilateral agreements may enable ISPs to peer without transfers, as long as the
sum of each ISPs net gains from peering is greater than zero, even if they were
not able to peer bilaterally.
4.3 Why pooling asymmetries may be a better idea than
bilateral paid peering
Introducing bilateral paid peering may make a high effort in bilateral peering re-
lations possible. However, as we will show now, it is only an imperfect substitute
for a multilateral agreement that pools payoff asymmetries.
Consider the situation from figures 8 and 9 and assume the stage game
between each pair of players to be given in figure 10, where L and R can take
the values of 1, 2, and 3 and ISP L is “to the left of” ISP R, i.e. we are looking
at ISP L’s home and ISP R’s foreign market.
ISP L
ISP R
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h
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h
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l
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l
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l
R − C
h
R B
l
L − C
l
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l
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l
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Figure 10: Normal form representation of the effort decision
If, in each period, ISP R transfers an amount T to ISP L, maintaining a
high quality peering link will be an equilibrium if and only if
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However, there are situations where these two incentive constraints are vi-
olated, whereas those in a multilateral mechanism are not. The multilateral
mechanism is an equilibrium if and only if
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Assume that this condition holds with equality. Then, adding up the con-
straints for enforcing high efforts in a bilateral paid peering relation and rear-
ranging would require
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(
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l
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1− δ
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or
−T ≥ 0.
As this cannot be satisfied, the multilateral mechanism sustains high efforts
for discount factors, for which bilateral paid peering does not. This argument
holds, as long as it is impossible for ISP R to withhold the transfer to ISP L
in the same period where ISP L provided low effort. Proposition 3 summarizes
this result.
Proposition 3 Bilateral paid peering is only an imperfect substitute for a mul-
tilateral punishment mechanism.
However, if pooling of payoff asymmetries across peering relations is not
possible, e.g. because one of the ISPs is an end node, then, as proposition 1 has
shown, having a bilateral paid peering agreement may enable the ISPs involved
to peer.
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4.4 Multilateral Paid Peering
So far, we have concentrated on comparing bilateral paid peering with multilat-
eral punishment mechanisms absent transfers. Having made the step toward a
network view on peering agreements, it is only logical to conceive also a multilat-
eral system of transfer payments T among peering partners. Then, clearly any
agreement implemented without transfer payments is equivalent to an agree-
ment with transfers T = (0, . . . , 0). Thus, any feasible multilateral agreement
involving positive transfers, if it is chosen unanimously over T = (0, . . . , 0),
can only Pareto-improve on the situation without transfers. Following the logic
of proposition 1, such an agreement is feasible as long as the small ISPs have
enough to gain as compared to the big ISPs9.
Proposition 4 A feasible multilateral agreement involving strictly positive trans-
fers Pareto-improves on a multilateral agreement without transfers.
5 Imperfect information transmission
A feature of peering relations is that the quality of the direct connection between
two ISPs is observed privately by the two ISPs sharing it. The exchange of
information, a frequently mentioned benefit from peering, may help overcome
this problem. In this section, we will show that, once a network perspective is
taken, this has implications for the peering decisions of large ISPs with smaller
ISPs as well as for bilateral paid peering.
As in the previous section, also here we will first briefly discuss theoretical
results in LS [19] and then apply them to shed light on the role of information
exchange may play within peering relationships among ISPs if they were to
make use of the network structure of the peering relationships. We will finally
apply these insights to give a reason why bilateral paid peering may be bad for
the peering ecosystem.
Once more, in the discussion that follows, it is useful to keep in mind that
not every pair of ISPs, who exchange traffic within a peering relationship, need
to be part of the relational network of peering relationships, which is formed by
a multilateral agreement. Bilateral and multilateral agreements may co-exist.
5.1 Imperfect information transmission in the theory of
relational networks
LS [19] show that the insight that pooling payoff asymmetries in a multilateral
punishment mechanism may help to sustain more cooperation than bilateral
agreements would (see review in section 4.1), generalize to environments in
which players do not know the histories of all other players, who are part of the
multilateral agreement.
9We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out this argument to us.
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1 2
4 3
Figure 11: Circular network with four players
Consider the situation from figure 11, where each pair of players is interacting
infinitely repeatedly in a prisoners’ dilemma as the one in the normal form from
figure 5 and where again an incoming arrow signifies that a player has a non-
negative net gain from cooperation in a particular relation. Assume that every
player only observes the history of his own interactions, i.e. 4 does not observe
the history of 1 and 2, and that communication about the history of play among
the players is not possible. LS [19] show that a simple modification of strategy
profile 1 may sustain cooperation in this case:
Strategy Profile 2 Every player, who is part of the multilateral agreement
1. starts playing C with every neighbor in the agreement,
2. continues playing C with every neighbor in the agreement as long as he
observes C from each neighbor in the agreement, and
3. reverts to D with every partner in the agreement for ever otherwise.
With strategy profile 2, if player 1 defects against player 2, he is punished
by player 4 with defection forever two periods later10, and LS [19] show that
cooperation in a multilateral agreement spanning a circular network, where
each player has a relation with a positive and one with a negative net gain
from cooperating, is sustainable if and only if for every player in the agreement
the sum of the net gains from cooperation, discounted appropriately, is non-
negative.
Consider, on the other hand, that each player can transmit information on
the history of his play as well as of information received from other neighbors.
Assume in addition that in every period of interaction, players can meet with
more than one neighbor to transmit information. In this informational envi-
ronment, LS [19] show that information will not be transmitted if it was made
part of strategy profile 2 to immediately transmit information about defections
to your neighbors. Given that there is no return to cooperation in the future,
every player is better off by keeping that information for himself and reaping
benefits of defection while his other neighbor cooperates for one last time.
10Given this and that he has a positive net gain from the relation with 4, his optimal
defection is to first defect from the relation with 2 and two periods later from the relation
with 4
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LS [19] go on to define multilateral repentance strategies, which they show
to overcome this problem, as follows.
Strategy Profile 3 Every player, who is part of the multilateral agreement
1. starts with C with every neighbor in the agreement, and
2. continues playing C with every neighbor in the agreement as long as no
deviation of a neighbor is observed or reported.
3. If a player observes D from neighbor j in the agreement, he
• sends a message about the deviation and goes on playing C with his
other neighbors in the agreement,
• plays D with the cheater until the cheater has played C with him for
a Tj periods,
• sends a message about the end of punishment and goes back to 2.
thereafter.
4. If a neighbor k of the cheater j receives the message of j’s cheating, he
• plays D with the cheater until both, the cheater has played C with him
for Tj periods, and he receives the message from the original sender
of the message about the carrying out of punishment
• goes back to 2. thereafter.
5. Deviants from 3. to 4. are subject to the same punishment.
LS [19] show that with these strategies, information will be transmitted as
(a) there is the prospect of a return to cooperation and (b) entering punishment
benefits the punisher. They also show that players will be able to sustain more
cooperation than with strategy profile 2, in fact, LS [19] show that repentance
(strategy profile 3) is an optimal penal code because (a) it makes use of fast
information transmission and (b), as the duration of the punishment phase Tj
can be individualized, it gives an expected continuation payoff of a cheater in a
punishment phase equivalent to his maximin payoff. In figure 11, player 4 could
get to know about 1’s betrayal against 2 already in the period of the betrayal,
leading to his punishment against 1 after one period as compared to after two
periods with the contagious strategies.
LS [19] finally study the impact of making bilaterally sustainable relations
part of a multilateral agreement, when there is imperfect information transmis-
sion. In the network from figure 11, increase the cooperation payoff of player 1 in
his relation with player 2, such that he has a positive net gain from cooperating.
This results in the network in figure 12.
For this case, LS [19] show that if (1) the beliefs11 of player 1, in case
he observes player 4 deviate and player 2 cooperate, is such that he does not
11One needs to amend strategy profile 2 by beliefs as now there is not anymore an automatic
incentive to punish. For reasons of brevity, we refer to LS [19] for a more detailed treatment
of that matter.
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1 2
4 3
Figure 12: Mixed network
put sufficient weight on player 2 having been the first to have deviated in the
network, and (2) players adhere to strategy profile 2, then cooperation in the
network may break down due to the fact that 1 does not have a sufficiently
high incentive to enter into a punishment phase with player 2. Strategy profile
3 on the other hand does not suffer from this problem as entering punishment
benefits the punisher.
5.2 Information transmission in peering
A frequently mentioned benefit from peering is exchange of information. In a
network of peering relations, ISPs would also benefit from transmitting infor-
mation about the quality of service within the bilateral peering relationships at
the IXP, which proxies for the level of effort chosen by the peering partner. This
increases the speed of targeted multilateral quality degradation with respect to
ISPs that provided low effort and thus, provides higher incentives to provide
high efforts.
ISP 1 ISP 2
ISP 4 ISP 3
Information exchange
Peering agreement
Figure 13: Circular Peering Network
Consider figure 13, where four ISPs are active in a total of four markets,
each of them in two of these markets. If the quality of service between each
pair of ISPs is their private information, ISP 4, for example, does not know
whether ISP 1 provided a high effort in his peering relation with ISP 2. He
observes only the quality of service provided by ISP3 and ISP 1 in their peering
agreement w.r.t. himself. If ISP 2 transmits information about ISP 1’s quality
to ISP 3, and if ISP 3 passes on this information to ISP 4, then ISPs 2 and 4
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can quickly degrade the quality provided to ISP 1. The faster this information
travels within the community, the stronger are the incentives to provide high
efforts.
Benefits from fast information transmission may in fact be large enough to
justify peering with smaller ISPs and should be taken into account in the peering
decisions. Suppose that two ISPs with a large installed base consider peering
with an ISP with a small installed base in a network of peering agreements. If
this peering agreement with the small ISP speeds up information transmission,
it may help sustain high effort peering agreements in the rest of the network.
Figure 14 describes the situation.
1
25
4 3
6
1
25
4 3
6
Information exchange Peering agreement
Figure 14: ISPs 1 and 4 peer with small ISP 6 for faster information transmission
If in the left-hand panel of figure 14 ISP 5 provides low efforts in his peering
relation with ISP 1, information about this must travel through three links
before it arrives at ISP 4 and, thus, before ISP 4 can also enter targeted quality
degradation in his peering relation with ISP 5. If ISP 1 and ISP 4 peer with the
small ISP 6, then the information must travel through only two links before it
arrives at ISP 4. This reduces the delay of the punishment.
Proposition 5 summarizes the arguments.
Proposition 5 1. Perfect information about interconnection quality within
a multilateral peering agreement is not necessary for the result that appro-
priate pooling of asymmetric peering relationships in multilateral agree-
ments may enable ISPs to peer without transfers.
2. If ISPs can exchange information on connection quality, they can im-
plement high quality connections for lower discount factors with multi-
lateral strategies, which use targeted, time-limited, harsh punishment of
cheaters12, than with multilateral strategies, which punish cheating by de-
peering13.
12like strategy profile 3
13like strategy profile 2
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5.3 Paid peering in peering networks
In section 4.3, we have shown that introducing bilateral paid peering it is only
an imperfect substitute for a multilateral peering agreement that pools payoff
asymmetries. Building on section 5.1, we will now argue that it may even be
harmful to other ISPs’ abilities to peer in multilateral peering agreements and,
thus, is “ecologically” bad.
Bilateral paid peering may make the choice of high effort enforceable on a
bilateral basis. Thus, if two ISPs agree on bilateral paid peering, their rela-
tionship becomes sustainable without the rest of the network and the peering
network will be a mixed network with the result of a reduced interdependence
of the individual elements of the network. If the punishment to low effort of
a neighboring ISP is permanent service degradation (e.g. through depeering)
toward both partner ISPs, this may prevent its ability to sustain a high quality
of service by deterring opportunistic quality-reducing strategies with the threat
of a “domino effect” on interconnection quality.
Proposition 6 Uncoordinated bilateral paid peering reduces the interdependence
of individual ISPs in the peering network and may, thus, prevent multilateral
peering agreements.
Note that our simple model neither takes into account any other costs of the
ISPs than those of maintaining the connection nor does it deal with network
formation or equilibrium selection. However, if one was to write down a more
complicated model, one might be able to come up with a strategic use of bilateral
paid peering: As it makes it more difficult for other ISPs to peer, using a network
of relations to enforce the high quality connection, it (a) raises rivals’ costs and
(b) reduces rival’s service quality. Both may be reasons for potential entrants
not to enter a market in the first place14.
6 Policy discussion and conclusions
Asymmetries between Internet Service Providers have been an obstacle to their
ability to enter in bilateral cooperative peering agreements. Given that unless
two ISPs are exchanging very little traffic, peering is the most efficient form of in-
terconnection, this means that desirable agreements do not come into existence,
also harming consumer welfare. Monetary compensation to balance asymmetric
allocations of costs and benefits of peering, the so-called “paid peering”, is seen
by many as a natural solution to this problem.
In this paper, we have argued that ISPs should take a network perspective
in their decision of whether to peer and whether to engage in paid peering.
Likewise, policy makers should adopt a network perspective in their advocacy
of peering and eventually paid peering.
Applying the theory of networks of relations, we find that ISPs may pool
asymmetric incentives to engage in cooperative peering through multilateral
14We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out this argument to us.
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agreements. Asymmetric traffic flows need not lead to asymmetric incentives to
peer, if the network is “closed” and information circulates in the network.
We clarified why bilateral paid peering, even though it may be good in a
bilateral peering relation, may actually be bad for the peering ecosystem by
making more bilateral peering relations sustainable on their own, independent
of other peering relationships. This reduced interdependence of individual el-
ements of the network may prevent its ability to sustain a high quality of ser-
vice by deterring opportunistic quality-reducing strategies with the threat of a
“domino effect” on interconnection quality.
We argue that large ISPs should adopt a global network approach when
defining their interconnection strategies, valuing asymmetric peering relation-
ships with smaller ISPs when these close the network and speed up information
transmission. Moreover, even if they take a network perspective, ISPs will still
be likely undervalue (at least from one side) asymmetric peering relations by
not fully internalizing the “social” value of a closed network. However, public
policies (e.g. subsidies) aimed at correcting this market failure could have the
same negative consequence of monetary payments in terms of reduced interde-
pendence and cooperation on quality maintenance in the network.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
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